

Plato's Theaetetus as an ethical dialogue

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It is a privilege to be able to dedicate this essay to my teacher, mentor, colleague, co-author and friend Tony Long, with pleasant memories of many past conversations about the *Theaetetus*.

The *Theaetetus* is by common consent one of the classic texts in the history of epistemology. But would Plato himself understand and endorse this description? If “epistemology” were defined simply as “the study of *epistēmē*,” it would be easy to answer affirmatively, *epistēmē* being after all the official topic of the dialogue. But does Plato recognize any area of philosophy that would correspond to what *we* call epistemology?

For the later Platonist tradition, “logic” had come to constitute one of the three parts of philosophy, alongside ethics and physics; and cognition of truth (often under the rubric “the criterion of truth”) was in its turn recognized as a primary focus of “logic”. Hence Platonist schematizations had no trouble in classing the *Theaetetus* as a “logical” dialogue if they so wished. The epitome of Plato preserved by Stobaeus (*Ecl.* 2.49.8–25) is able to say that the goal of “becoming like god” is set out by Plato in the *Timaeus* from the point of view of physics (φυσικῶς), in the *Republic* from the point of view of ethics (ἠθικῶς), and in the *Theaetetus* from the point of view of logic (λογικῶς). This classification of the *Theaetetus* as “logical” was not mandatory, however, and in fact in Thrasyllus’ second Platonic tetralogy the dialogue was, although placed in a logical group, itself classed as “peirastic,” in recognition of its primary focus on testing and exposing false views of knowledge rather than laying down the truth about it. Nevertheless, the idea of classifying the *Theaetetus* as an epistemological dialogue can, without excessive anachronism, be said to have made sense in a post-Platonic context.

How about Plato himself? How far does he go towards that eventual tripartition of philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic? Two passages offer a glimpse of the answer. At *Timaeus* 29b3–d3 he distinguishes just

two kinds of discourse (λόγος): inherently unstable discourse about the sensible world, in other words physics; and inherently stable discourse about being. The latter kind of discourse acquires its stability from the fact that its proper objects are Forms, entities not subject to change. We are not required to limit this latter kind of discourse to the study of ontology as such, and it must in fact include the kind of work to which Platonic dialectic had been devoted in many previous dialogues, largely of ethical content, on the ground that the objects of ethical inquiry and definition are stable concepts, or, more specifically, Forms. As we encounter it in the dialogues, this kind of discourse admittedly does not take exclusively Forms as its subject matter, and includes plenty of empirically focused discussion, but at least ideally Plato viewed it as focused on Forms alone (*Rep.* 6.511b2–c2).

In the *Timaeus*, then, we are confronted with a *bipartition* of philosophy into (a) physics and (b) the study of stable being, the latter including ethics.

The second text, one which enables us to put some flesh on these bare bones, is the *Cratylus*. There the long series of etymologies set out in the central part of the dialogue takes as its subject matter a comprehensive set of philosophical terms, following an order which is anything but casual. It appears to offer us, in fact, a synopsis of Plato's own division of philosophy at the time of writing, and there is much waiting for us to learn if we start paying proper attention to it.¹ After working systematically through physics, the etymological excursus announces a switch to ethics, "the names . . . concerning virtue, such as wisdom and understanding and justice, and all the others of that kind" (411a3–4), which Socrates condemns *en bloc* (411b3–c5) as having been coined to convey the false impression that values are inherently unstable: for instance, he will shortly be decoding *phronēsis*, "wisdom", as *phoras noēsis*, "thinking of motion". The ensuing ethical survey then occupies in effect the entire remainder of the etymological excursus. Hence Plato's bipartition of philosophy proves to be into (a) physics and (b) ethics. How such a bipartition can be thought to exhaust the subject matter of philosophy will become clear in a moment.

The sequence within the ethical section is as follows:

- (i) the virtues, in the presumably descending order
 - (a) intellectual virtues (411d4–412b8);²

¹ I am here drawing on my findings in Sedley 2003: 156–58.

² A little anomalously, ἀγαθόν is considered in between (a) and (b), at 412b8–c6. The reason, I assume, is that it is here functioning in its role as the adjective whose abstract noun is ἀρετή, and hence as a proper lead-in to the moral virtues.

- (b) moral virtues (412c7–414a7);
- (c) technical virtues (414b7–415a7).
- (2) The generic terms for moral evaluation (415a7–419b7).
- (3) Terms from moral psychology (419b7–420e5).
- (4) The more strictly logical terms “name,” “truth,” “falsity,” “being,” and “not-being,” familiarly analysed in the *Sophist* (421a1–c2).

What was later to be separated off as “logic” is here unmistakably a part of ethics. That (4) is still part of the ethical section, and not a new beginning, is confirmed by the way in which it seamlessly continues to fill out Socrates’ condemnation of ethical language as vitiated by a mistaken belief in instability.

The opening focus on knowledge terms and the closing focus on truth, by framing the whole account, confirm that intellectual understanding is integral to ethics. Coming from someone who had seriously contemplated the reduction of all virtue to knowledge, and who never retreated far from considering wisdom the best possible state of the soul, whether in our present life or at any rate after it, this classification should be anything but surprising.

Admittedly this bipartition, when compared with the later standard tripartition of philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic, appears unenlightening. If even a dialogue like the *Sophist* is, thanks to its concern with being and not-being, part of ethics, it may turn out that *all* Plato’s dialogues, with the solitary exception of the *Timaeus*,³ are likewise ethical, or alternatively that some, perhaps even including the *Cratylus* itself, fit nowhere in the scheme. It was only in later generations, when “logic” became a distinct third part of philosophy, that dialogues like *Cratylus*, *Parmenides*, and *Sophist* could be classified as logical, and partitioning philosophy gained real value as a didactic or hermeneutic tool. Nevertheless, the primitive bipartition is, however latently, a genuine part of Plato’s own outlook, and understanding the consequently wide reach of Platonic ethics will prove to be an important part of the background to the *Theaetetus*.

Let us, with this goal in mind, turn to the sequence of intellectual virtues with which the *Cratylus*’ ethical list opens. These are wisdom (*phronēsis*), judgement (*gnōmē*), intellection (*noēsis*), temperance (*sōphrosunē*), knowledge (*epistēmē*), understanding (*sunesis*), and wisdom again (this time *sophia*). The fact that they are followed almost immediately by a second

³ Of course even the *Timaeus* has a large ethical content, but it was always treated as Plato’s work on physics, and the *Cratylus* confirms this by treating its cosmological themes separately, before the ethics. See further Sedley 2003: 156–58.

group, consisting of justice (*dikaïosunē*) and courage (*andreia*), confirms that this first list is specifically a list of intellectual virtues. The one apparent anomaly is *sōphrosunē*, which we may well be inclined to think of as a moral rather than an intellectual virtue. I shall return to its anomalous status at the end of the essay, where it should become clear just why it does in fact belong properly among the intellectual virtues. All the other words in the first group are ones which emphasize intellectual understanding rather than moral disposition. They include not only the two terms conventionally translated “wisdom,” namely *phronēsis* and *sophia*, but also *epistēmē*, the definiendum of the *Theaetetus*.

We thus have a *prima facie* expectation that Plato himself would view the *Theaetetus* as an ethical dialogue.⁴ The second reason for that same expectation is the following. In the classic dialogues of definition, four of the five cardinal virtues had been tackled: piety in the *Euthyphro*, courage in the *Laches*, moderation in the *Charmides*, and justice in the *Republic*. The missing fifth cardinal virtue is wisdom. Why did Plato never complete the set by writing a dialogue on that? Or perhaps he did. It seems to me highly plausible that in the opening moves of the *Theaetetus* Plato is reassuring us that this dialogue is to be, at last, the missing treatment of exactly that virtue.

Socrates turns his conversation with the young mathematics student Theaetetus to the subject of learning (145d7–e7):

SOCR. . . . Tell me, is to learn to become wiser about what one learns?

THT. Of course.

SOCR. And it is wisdom (*sophia*) that makes the wise wise?

THT. Yes.

SOCR. And I take it that this is nothing different from knowledge?

THT. What is?

SOCR. Wisdom. Or isn't it true that what people are knowledgeable about they are also wise about?

THT. What are you getting at?

SOCR. Knowledge and wisdom turn out to be the same thing?

THT. Yes.

This exchange shifts the topic of the dialogue to knowledge, where thereafter it stays. But why did Socrates choose to take so circuitous a route? He could simply have pointed out, exploiting a standard equivalence, that

⁴ In defending this thesis, I shall not be systematically cataloguing the ethical themes and implications present in the dialogue (cf. *Timaeus*, previous note). But for an account of the *Theaetetus* as ethical which does focus on its ethical themes, especially in the Digression, see van Ackeren 2003: 226–58.

to learn is to acquire knowledge. Instead he added an extra link to the inferential chain, by pointing out the identity of “wisdom” with “knowledge”. This additional link in the chain is neatly explained by reference to an authorial strategy for reminding the reader that, in seeking to define knowledge, the *Theaetetus* will *ipso facto* be examining the virtue of wisdom. The interchangeability of “knowledge” and “wisdom,” exploited here, has a good Socratic pedigree in the Platonic corpus: wisdom (normally *sophia* or *phronēsis*) is referred to as *epistēmē* in lists of the virtues at both *Protagoras* 330b4 and *Phaedrus* 247d7.

One might reasonably ask why, if the virtue of wisdom will be under examination in the dialogue, the kind of learning which gives Socrates his initial cue for mentioning wisdom should be mathematical learning such as that in which the young Theaetetus engages under Theodorus’ instruction.

Here, as often in this dialogue, it is helpful to leave a gap between the author Plato and the speaker Socrates. That moral understanding must grow from the study of mathematics would be unlikely to occur to the barren midwife of others’ ideas who is portrayed in the *Theaetetus*. For he represents, at least on the interpretation I have argued elsewhere,⁵ a reversion to the inquisitive but self-confessedly ignorant Socrates portrayed in the early dialogues, presented here with hindsight not as a Platonist *avant la lettre*, but as Platonism’s midwife, the open-minded inquirer whose interrogations unwittingly brought Plato’s philosophy into the world.

If we assume this broad framework of interpretation, we must ask what in the present case are the Platonic developments to which Socrates’ inquiries point forward. In the *Republic* the profound continuity between mathematical and moral education is the pivot on which the entire educational programme turns. There the trainee rulers are expected to spend ten years studying mathematics before they are ready to turn to dialectic, which itself in turn will culminate in the study of the Good. Only after that will they have the moral knowledge required of rulers. This doctrine is Plato’s own, not traceable back to the Socrates of his early dialogues. In the *Theaetetus*, his recreated aporetic Socrates shows no inkling of any such link between mathematics and ethics, but Plato’s authorial strategy keeps it in view for us. The young Theaetetus has already solved a problem in arithmetic by correlating two classes of number to two classes of geometrical figure, and has gone on to perform a similar operation for cubic numbers; in other words he has progressed from arithmetic, through plane geometry to solid

⁵ Sedley 2004.

geometry, the first three stages of mathematical education in the *Republic*. In the future he wants Theodorus to teach him astronomy and harmonics (145d1–3), the remaining two bridge disciplines in the *Republic*. In the course of the dialogue itself he is going to be initiated into dialectic. And as we know from the proem, which recounts his death, he will go on to become a true *kalos kagathos* who conducts himself with exemplary heroism in time of war (142b6–8). The authorial subtext thus reveals that the teenager Theaetetus, already far advanced on the *Republic's* educational programme, is on his way to moral virtue.

Having thus bridged the apparent gulf between mathematical and moral knowledge, we can largely dispel the worry that knowledge is considered in the *Theaetetus* from too narrowly epistemological a point of view to contribute to an ethical inquiry. That even non-moral knowledge is more morally relevant than one might at first have expected is itself a deeply Platonic subtext.

At the same time, the *Theaetetus* narrows the gap between intellectual and moral understanding in the reverse direction as well: moral knowledge is ultimately less distinctively moral than one might think. The place where such a narrowing becomes clearest is in the Digression which stands at the dialogue's exact centre (172a1–177c2). This excursus is occasioned by the observation (172b7–8) that even those who do not embrace wholesale Protagorean relativism sometimes adhere to *moral* relativism. Socrates' ensuing answer to moral relativism is a portrayal of the true philosopher as altogether detaching himself from the civic conditions that make moral standards appear inextricably context-dependent, and instead focusing on god as the absolute moral paradigm. Adherence to this divine standard turns out to transform moral understanding in an initially surprising way: although by emulating it the philosopher becomes "just", his is a derelativized justice which takes him far away from concern with justice as practised in familiar civic situations, and far even from care for the welfare of his fellow men. He is so focused on questions about universals, such as "What is a human being?", that he is barely aware whether his neighbour *is* a human being or not (174b1–6); and, by implication, he is so focused on inquiry into "justice and injustice themselves" that he has left behind such questions as "What injustice I am doing you, or you me?" (175b8–c2). True justice lies not in sorting out relative rights and wrongs in the law courts and other civic institutions, but in acquiring a radically non-perspectival, and in that sense godlike, level of understanding.

I am aware of the controversy surrounding this interpretation. I cannot return to its defence here, beyond remarking that it remains in my view

the only natural and unforced reading of the passage. Those interpreters who have refused to accept it have also typically been unwilling to accept at face value the apparent meaning of other passages in Plato and Aristotle which similarly present the highest intellectual achievement as raising the philosopher above interpersonal morality. These include the ascent passage in the *Symposium*, which makes the ultimate achievement of love one that leaves behind personal affection for individuals, in favour of a direct union with the Beautiful itself; the concession in *Republic* VII that true philosophers will find a life of detached contemplation more fulfilling and desirable than one of discharging their civic duties, with the result that they will have to be “compelled” to play their part in government;⁶ the declaration near the end of the *Timaeus* (89e3–90d7) that the highest form of human happiness lies not in harmony of the soul (*Republic* IV’s analysis of moral virtue), but in the divinization of its immortal rational component alone; and Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* X 6–8, where on the most natural and straightforward reading the contemplative life, in which the exercise of moral virtues plays no more than an incidental part, is the highest form of human happiness, outclassing any possible life centred on civic engagement. The pattern is in my view too emphatic and recurrent to be plausibly explained away each time. It is better to accept that, in the opinion of both Plato and Aristotle, the superiority of the intellectual to the moral virtues makes an intellectual or contemplative life superior to a moral life.

However, this precise way of putting it, in terms of contemplative versus moral, is Aristotelian. Plato’s own view, as evidenced in the *Theaetetus*, is that the intellectual life which withdraws from civic engagement is itself the life of true “justice” (176a9–b2: “to become as like god as is possible . . . is to become just and holy, together with wisdom”). In other words, at the highest level of human attainment moral values are not abandoned, but instead are realigned as ultimately intellectual ones, characterized by an absoluteness which raises them higher than any interpersonal focus could take them. In the *Phaedo* the soul’s escape into the realm of pure intellectual self-fulfilment had been seen as fully realizable only after death; but the *Theaetetus*, a dialogue which in true Socratic spirit de-emphasizes (although it does not exclude) the soul’s expectations of post mortem survival, correspondingly locates that same escape (“to escape from here to there as quickly as possible”, 176a9) within the confines of an incarnate human life. Even as a human being physically located in a city you can

⁶ For the view that I am contesting here, cf. esp. Silverman (this volume).

become a godlike pure contemplator. The historical Socrates' political minimalism is, it seems, being interpreted with hindsight as hinting at this idealized realignment of virtue, away from the civic and towards the intellectual.

Here then is a second reason why we should hesitate to class the knowledge investigated in the *Theaetetus* as non-moral. At the highest level, moral understanding and pure intellectual understanding are not ultimately separable, because the former culminates in the latter. For Plato both the starting point and the highest achievement of moral living are essentially intellectual in character. This relative ranking of the moral and the intellectual, so hard for us to treat with sympathy but so central to ancient philosophical thought, is explicit in the *Theaetetus* digression, and does much to explain why, throughout the dialogue's definitional discussions, the moral implications of wisdom are not privileged over others.

At the end of the dialogue, Theaetetus has turned out after all not to be intellectually pregnant. Nevertheless, Socrates' midwifery has benefited him:

Suppose that in the future you try to become pregnant with other ideas, Theaetetus. If you succeed, you will be filled with better ideas thanks to today's investigation; and if you are empty, you will be less burdensome to those you associate with ἦπτον . . . βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι), and nicer (ἡμερώτερος), thanks to your having the modesty not to think that you know things that you don't know (σωφρόνως οὐκ οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ἅ μὴ οἶσθα). (210b11–c4)

By being disabused of his pretensions to knowledge, Theaetetus has acquired a degree of *sōphrosunē*. What is this virtue, which puts in its first appearance only on the final page of the dialogue?

In Plato's well-known definition of it in *Republic* IV, *sōphrosunē* is self-control, taking the specific form of harmonious agreement among the three soul parts that reason should give the orders, and the other two obey them. But the term also has, prior to that, a Socratic history. In the *Charmides*, the dialogue which Plato devoted to its definition, it has often been noticed that the "self-control" conception of *sōphrosunē* is resoundingly absent. Instead, the definitions canvassed are, no doubt, as usual in order of increasing merit, (1) being laid-back (159b–160d), (2) modesty (αἰδώς, 160e–161b), (3) minding one's own business (161b–163c), (4) doing good (163d–e), (5) self-knowledge (164a–165b), and (6) knowing what one knows and what one does not know, i.e. knowledge of knowledge and ignorance (165b–175d). (Most interpreters find a seventh definition, "knowledge of good and bad," at 174d, but I do not believe it is intended as a definition.)

It should be clear that the reference to *sōphrosunē* at the end of the *Theaetetus* uses it in a sense far closer to these definitions from the *Charmides* than to the “self-control” aspect picked out in the *Republic*. If Theaetetus is disabused of the impression that he possesses knowledge, Socrates has said, he will be less burdensome company, thanks to his modesty in not thinking that he knows what he does not know. This echoes the picture presented by Charmides’ three definitions (1–3), which jointly emphasize that possessors of *sōphrosunē* are not pushy towards others, and mind their own business. But it also, more specifically, takes up the implications of Critias’ two main definitions (i.e. 5–6; definition 4, “doing good”, is offered in passing and not seriously discussed). According to these, *sōphrosunē* is not merely self-knowledge, but more specifically self-knowledge with regard to one’s state of knowledge or ignorance. This particular brand of intellectualism has often been recognized as being of Socratic inspiration. Socrates responds to Critias as follows:

So the *sōphrōn* is the only person who will know himself and be able to determine what he does know and what he does not. And likewise with regard to others, he will be able to examine what someone knows and thinks he knows, in the case where that person knows, and on the other hand what someone thinks he knows but doesn’t know. No one else will have this ability. And that’s what being *sōphrōn*, *sōphrosunē*, and self-knowledge are, namely knowing what one knows and what one does not. (*Charmides* 167a1–7)

Socrates proceeds to attack this conception, on the ground that knowledge could not have knowledge and lack of knowledge as its object. His hostile reaction has caused some puzzlement, because Socrates’ distinctive hallmark is widely seen as being, precisely, his avowed knowledge of his own (and others’) ignorance. This is, indeed, seen as being his favoured interpretation, in the *Apology*, of what his own “wisdom,” attributed to him by the oracle, in fact consists in (*Apol.* 23b). However, nowhere in Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle or any pre-Hellenistic source is Socrates ever represented as claiming to have knowledge of his own ignorance. At most he is prepared to say that he “knows that in reality he is worthless with regard to wisdom” (23b3–4, ἐγνωνκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἀξίος ἐστὶ τῆ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίᾳ); that “For my own part, neither in a large way nor in a small one am I aware of being wise” (21b4–5, ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν σύννοιδά ἐμαυτῶ σοφὸς ὦν); and that “Just as I do not know, so too I do not even think I know” (21d5–6, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶομαι). All these formulations stop well short of the second-order knowledge claim, “I know that I know nothing,” attributed to Socrates in

the later tradition.⁷ Hence I see no reason to take less than seriously the implications of his argument in the *Charmides*: any cognitive state must have a suitably correlated object or content distinct from itself, and cannot be merely self-reflexive. The joint message of the *Apology* and *Charmides* is that modest acceptance of one's own ignorance is an inherently desirable form of self-awareness, but that it cannot, on pain of incoherence, be interpreted as a self-reflexive branch of knowledge.

However, the philosophical motives of the limitation imposed in the *Charmides* are anything but clear. What would Socrates have lost, or risked, by allowing that one might in principle have knowledge of one's own knowledge or ignorance?⁸ Plato's own longer-term motivation is likely to have lain in his growing conviction that knowledge, properly analysed as in the *Republic* and *Timaeus*, must have objective and unchangeable "being" as its object,⁹ and that the subject's own psychological states are simply not suitable candidates for this.¹⁰ If so, there is a natural appropriateness in the *Theaetetus*' closing reminder of the point, especially if one assumes, as I do, that the dialogue's failure to define knowledge is meant to open up a space which the *Republic*'s epistemology alone can fill.

What, at any rate, the close of the *Theaetetus* makes clear is the following. Young Theaetetus has been proved not to know what knowledge is. His own epistemic state, whether one of knowledge or of ignorance, is therefore something he cannot possibly be said to know, given only that you could not know that you are or are not in such and such a condition if you do not even know what that condition is. Despite this, he has grown in virtue: he is now less likely than before to think that he knows things which in fact he does not know, and it is in fact in that enhanced lack of pretension that

⁷ Since I wrote the above, Gail Fine has published a full study of the topic (Fine 2008), arriving at a broadly similar conclusion. At *Alc.* 117b–118a (not discussed by Fine) Socrates does recommend – albeit without explicitly avowing it for himself – actual knowledge of one's own lack of knowledge. This is as far as I know unique in the Socratic dialogues, and might be added to the reasons for doubting the authenticity of *Alcibiades*.

⁸ That knowledge about knowledge (albeit not about one's own knowledge) is possible is conceded at *Meno* 98b2–5, but that is the kind of cognition that would, in Plato's mature metaphysics, be counted as knowledge of the Form of knowledge.

⁹ Note in this connection that at *Charm.* 168a, in another anticipation of *Republic* V, Socrates reveals his assumption that not only ἐπιστήμη but also δόξα must have its own distinct external object.

¹⁰ In the *Charmides*, even though his closing summary (175b6–7) declares without qualification that the argument has disallowed any such option, at 169a1–b1 Socrates has in fact left open the possibility that a sufficiently great man might still be able to show that there can after all be knowledge of knowledge. But Plato did not resume the idea in subsequent dialogues, and I assume him to have eventually abandoned it in the light of *Rep.* 5's redefinition of ἐπιστήμη as requiring an unchangeable object, an abandonment which I read the close of the *Theaetetus* as tending to confirm.

his new-found *sōphrosunē* lies. Is this new *sōphrosunē* an intellectual virtue, a moral virtue, or both?

On the one hand it is characterized in moral language, reminiscent of Charmides' opening definitions of *sōphrosunē* in terms of modesty, keeping oneself to oneself, etc. Henceforth, Theaetetus is told, "you will be less burdensome to those whose company you keep" (ἥττον . . . βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι), and to that extent a nicer (ἡμερώτερος) person. This is not just a matter of curbing a young man's irritating self-confidence. Those who think they know what in fact they do not are well exemplified by Meletus, Socrates' accuser mentioned just a few lines later – in the dialogue's final sentence (210d2–4), as Socrates hurries off to face his judicial hearing. They are equally familiar to Plato's readers in the person of the frightful bigot Euthyphro, whose misplaced confidence that he knows all about piety leads him to the most high-handed conduct imaginable towards his own father. Most striking of all, the expression "less burdensome to those whose company you keep" (ἥττον . . . βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι) finds an echo in the later *Politicus*, where tyranny is of all regimes the "most burdensome to live with" (302e12, βαρυτάτη συνοικῆσαι). The tyrant is Plato's favoured model of the extreme depths of moral vice; so Theaetetus, by his emerging self-awareness, has moved even further away from the tyrannical end of the moral scale. We need not doubt, therefore, that Theaetetus' new-won *sōphrosunē* is a significant moral improvement, of strongly Socratic stamp.

On the other hand, that same moral improvement is being cast in pointedly intellectualist terms. Theaetetus has improved intellectually by arming himself against the belief that he knows what he in fact does not. Thus at the dialogue's close, much as in its opening pages and, in the Digression, at its mathematical midpoint, moral and intellectual virtue converge on each other. The Socratic project of intellectualizing virtue has not been eclipsed by the complex psychology of the *Republic*, but remains a vital part of Plato's agenda.¹¹

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